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Abstract 
AI Ethics is now a global topic of discussion in academic and policy circles. At least 63 public-private initiatives 
have produced statements describing high-level principles, values, and other tenets to guide the ethical 
development, deployment, and governance of AI. According to recent meta-analyses, AI Ethics has seemingly 
converged on a set of principles that closely resemble the four classic principles of medical ethics. Despite the 
initial credibility granted to a principled approach to AI Ethics by the connection to principles in medical ethics, 
there are reasons to be concerned about its future impact on AI development and governance. Significant 
differences exist between medicine and AI development that suggest a principled approach in the latter may not 
enjoy success comparable to the former. Compared to medicine, AI development lacks (1) common aims and 
fiduciary duties, (2) professional history and norms, (3) proven methods to translate principles into practice, and 
(4) robust legal and professional accountability mechanisms. These differences suggest we should not yet 
celebrate consensus around high-level principles that hide deep political and normative disagreement. 
1 What medicine can teach us about ‘AI Ethics’ 
AI Ethics is now a global topic of discussion in academic and policy circles. Significant 
resources have been dedicated to public-private initiatives aiming to define universal high-level 
values or principles to guide ethical development and deployment of AI.1 These initiatives can 
help focus public debate on a common set of issues and principles, and raise awareness among 
the public, developers and institutions of the ethical challenges that accompany AI.2
 To date, at least 63 such ‘AI Ethics’ initiatives have published reports describing high-level 
ethical principles, tenets, values, or other abstract requirements for AI development and 
deployment.3 Many envision these high-level contributions being ‘translated’ into mid- or low-
level design requirements and technical fixes, governance frameworks, and developer codes of 
ethics.1  
Existing initiatives to codify AI Ethics are not without their critics. Many initiatives are at least 
partially sponsored by industry, which has led some commentators to suggest they exist for 
disingenuous virtue signalling intended merely to delay regulation and pre-emptively shape the 
debate around abstract problems and technical solutions.1,4 This view undeniably has some 
merit: AI Ethics initiatives have thus far have produced vague, high-level principles and value 
statements which promise to be action-guiding, but in practice provide few specific 
recommendations5 and fail to address fundamental normative and political tensions embedded 
in key concepts (e.g. fairness, privacy).ii Declarations by AI companies and developers 
committing themselves to high-level ethical principles and self-regulatory codes nonetheless 
provide policy-makers with a reason not to pursue new regulation.5,7  
                                                 
i Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 1 St. Giles, Oxford, OX1 3JS, UK; the Alan Turing Institute, 
British Library, 96 Euston Road, London, NW1 2DB, UK. Correspondence via brent.mittelstadt@oii.ox.ac.uk.  
ii There are, of course, a few exceptions; the IEEE ‘Ethically Aligned Design’ initiative,6 for instance, has been 
impressive in its scale, interdisciplinarity, and creation of subsequent projects to develop ethical standards and 
curriculum for AI. 
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Comparisons have recently been drawn between AI Ethics initiatives and medical ethics8 A 
recent review undertaken by the AI4People project found that AI Ethics initiatives have 
converged on a set of principles that closely resemble the four classic principles of medical 
ethics.9 This position was subsequently endorsed by the OECD10 and the European 
Commission’s High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (HLEG),iii which proposed 
four principles to guide the development of ‘trustworthy’ AI: respect for human autonomy, 
prevention of harm, fairness, and explicability.13  
This convergence of AI Ethics around principles defined in medical ethics is opportune, as it 
is perhaps the most prominent and well-studied approach to applied ethics to date. 
‘Principilism’ emerged from medicine as a theoretical moral framework grounded in the 
experiences of practitioners, research ethics committees, and medical institutions in grappling 
with ethics on a case-by-case basis.14 These experiences revealed that ethical decision-making 
on the ground often involves a trade-off or ‘weighting’ of interests to decide upon the ethically 
appropriate course of action. Principilism formalised these interests around four core principles 
that provide guidance and require balancing in different contexts.15 Whereas ‘principilism’ in 
medical ethics ensures a principled approach to setting health policy and clinical decision-
making, a principled approach in AI Ethics seems intended to embed principles and normative 
concerns in technology design and governance. Both approaches address how to embed 
principles into professional practice. The convergence of AI Ethics around medical ethical 
principles thus provides a helpful backdrop to assess the current state and potential success of 
AI Ethics in terms of enacting real change in the development and deployment of AI. 
Despite the initial credibility granted to a principled approach to AI Ethics by the connection 
to principles in medical ethics, there are reasons to be concerned about its future impact on AI 
development and governance. Significant differences exist between medicine and AI 
development that suggest a principled approach in the latter may not enjoy success comparable 
to the former. Medical ethics thus provides an insightful mirror to critically examine the 
potential weaknesses of a principled approach to ethics in AI development and governance.iv 
2 The challenges of a principled approach to AI Ethics 
When compared with medical ethics, four potential weaknesses of AI Ethics become apparent 
that suggest a principled approach may have limited impact on AI development. Compared to 
medicine, AI development lacks (1) common aims and fiduciary duties, (2) professional history 
and norms, (3) proven methods to translate principles into practice, and (4) robust legal and 
professional accountability mechanisms.  
                                                 
iii It is worth noting that a second body in the European Commission, the European Group on Ethics in Science 
and New Technologies (EGE), also issued a statement in 2018 on AI Ethics that does not align with the 
approach advocated by the HLEG.11 The EGE later wrote an open letter12 to President Jean-Clause Juncker 
drawing attention to shortcomings of the Commission’s current approach to AI Ethics, most notably criticising 
“technological mastery” being pursued as an end in itself and the lack of emphasis placed on operationalisation 
of principles. 
iv The comparisons drawn in the remainder of the paper will hold even if AI Ethics initiatives were to move 
away from the four principles borrowed from medical ethics. The target of analysis here is a principled approach 
to ethics in AI development and governance, not of utility or justifiability of the four principles themselves. 
Many of the points addressed apply to professions featuring codes of conduct or codes of ethics that 
significantly shape practice within the profession and are not limited to medicine.14 
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2.1 Common aims and fiduciary duties 
Medicine is broadly guided by a common aim: to promote the health and well-being of the 
patient.16 It is a defining quality of a profession for its practitioners to be part of a ‘moral 
community’ with common aims, values, and training.17–19 While there is much disagreement 
over how best to promote health and well-being in practice, the interests of patients, medical 
professionals, and medical institutions remain aligned at a fundamental level which encourages 
solidarity and trust.v The pursuit of a common goal facilitates a principled approach to ethical 
decision-making.  
Solidarity cannot be taken for granted in AI development. AI is largely developed by the private 
sector for deployment in public (e.g. criminal sentencing) and private (e.g. insurance) contexts.  
The fundamental aims of developers, users, and affected parties do not necessarily align. 
Developers often “work in an environment which constantly pressures them to cut costs, 
increase profit and deliver higher quality” systems, and face pressure from management to 
make decisions that benefit the company at the cost of user interests.20,21 While health 
professionals undoubtedly face organisational pressures similar in nature, they are not 
equivalent in degree. Unlike medicine, AI development does not serve the equivalent of a 
‘patient’ whose interests are granted initial primacy in ethical decision-making. This lack of a 
common goal transforms ethical decision-making from a cooperative to a competitive process, 
which makes finding a balance between public and private interests much more difficult in 
practice. 
The implicit solidarity of medicine is formally recognised in professional codes of practice and 
medical law that establish fiduciary duties towards patients who must trust that health 
professionals will act in their best interests.22 Formal professions are defined by trust between 
clients and practitioners, mediated by common goals and values within the profession, and 
enforced through sanctions and self-governance.17,23,24 The fiduciary duties derived from the 
client-practitioner relationship separate ‘professions’ from other vocations,25 and facilitate a 
principled approach to ethical decision-making by requiring practitioners to promote their 
clients’ best interests.  
AI development is not a formal profession. An equivalent fiduciary relationship does not exist 
for the private sector practitioners and institutions that develop and deploy AI; nor do 
mechanisms with comparable weight to fiduciary duties.5 AI developers do not commit to 
‘public service’, which in other professions requires practitioners to uphold public interests in 
the face of competing business or managerial interests.23 For AI deployed in the public sector, 
such a commitment may be implicit in institutional or political structures. The same cannot be 
said for the private sector. Companies have principal fiduciary duties towards their 
shareholders which can conflict with the interests of users and affected parties. Public interests 
are not granted primacy over commercial interests. 
The lack of a fiduciary relationship means that users cannot trust that AI developers will act in 
their best interests when implementing ethical principles in practice. Affected parties without 
a ‘seat at the table’ cannot take for granted that their interests will be given serious 
consideration. Reputational risks may push companies to engage with ethics, but they carry 
                                                 
v This is true of other professions and practices where a principled approach to ethics has been successful. 
Filipović et al. provide an overview of how this characteristic manifests in other professions.14 
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weight only as long as they remain in the public consciousness. Personal moral conviction may 
also push AI developers towards ‘good’ behaviour;26 recent examples of internal protests at 
Google provide some cause for hope.27,28 However, incentive structures discourage placing 
public interests before the company, and may include sanctions against ‘whistle-blowers’ (e.g. 
job loss, lack of advancement; see recent reports of backlash against protest organisers at 
Google).29 Virtuous behaviour may therefore come at a high personal cost. This situation is 
unacceptable; users and affected parties should not need to rely on the personal convictions of 
developers, fear of reputational damage, or public outcry for their vital interests in privacy, 
autonomy, identity, and other areas to be taken seriously.30 
2.2 Professional history and norms 
The second weakness of a principled approach to AI Ethics is the lack of professional history 
and well-defined norms of ‘good’ behaviour. Medicine has a long history and shared 
professional culture with variation across regions and specialties. Norms of ‘good behaviour’ 
and codes of conduct have developed over centuries in these contexts. In Western biomedicine, 
longstanding standards set in the Hippocratic Oath, the Declaration of Geneva, the Declaration 
of Helsinki, and other accounts of the ‘good’ health professional have served as a basis for 
clinical decision-making and research ethics, and inspired the development of ethics and codes 
in other professions.14 As new technologies and treatments disrupt established norms, the 
profession can look back on a long ethical tradition to update best practices and its account of 
a ‘good’ health professional. Evidence of this historical development of an account of being a 
‘good’ health professional can be seen in the American Medical Association’s Code of Medical 
Ethics, a lengthy document detailing opinions, behavioural norms, and standards across a 
plethora of medical practices and technologies.31 Over time, Western medical ethics has 
converged around key principles formalised in the ‘principilism’ moral framework, which 
defines four principles to guide ethical decision-making.15 This culture, and the values 
underlying it, has a strong regulating influence on the behaviour of medical practitioners.  
AI development does not have a comparable history, homogenous professional culture, 
uniform professional identity, or a similarly developed professional ethics. Whereas AI can in 
principle be deployed in any context involving human expertise, medicine in comparison has 
narrower aims (see: Section 2.1) which facilitates development of standard practices and 
norms. Likewise, AI development includes practitioners from varied disciplines and 
professions such as software engineering and data science, which have incongruous histories, 
cultures, incentive structures, and ethics.14,23,24 Software engineering, which is the closest 
analogue, has historically not been legally recognised as a profession with fiduciary duties to 
the public14,32 due to a perceived lack of licensure schemes and a well-defined ‘standard of 
care’ for the profession.33 Reflecting this, a comparably rich account of what it means to be a 
‘good’ AI developer or software engineer does not exist; while the IEEE and ACM, two of the 
field’s largest professional associations, have published codes of ethics, these documents are 
comparatively short and relatively lacking in grounded advice and specific behavioural 
norms.vi As a result, it remains unclear what it means, in practice, to be a ‘good’ AI developer. 
                                                 
vi It is worth noting, however, that the 2018 update to the ACM’s code of ethics placed greater emphasis on 
discussion of specific behaviours. However, even with this encouraging shift in focus, the code remains 
comparatively brief when contrasted with codes in other professions.14 
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Developing such an account will not be easy. Systems are often created by large, multi-
disciplinary and multi-national teams. Whereas the effects of clinical decision-making are often 
immediate and obvious, the impact of decisions taken in designing, training, and configuring 
an AI system for different uses may never become apparent to development teams.34 This is 
worrying, as distance from potential victims has been shown to have a positive effect on 
unethical professional behaviour.35 The risks addressed in medical ethics arise in reference to 
interventions performed on a ‘physical body’ (e.g. clinical or ‘bed-side interventions). In 
comparison, the risks of AI and data ethics are continuous and not similarly bound, and may 
not be directly experienced by data subjects.36 Systems are also often ‘opaque’ in the sense that 
no single person will have a full understanding of the system’s design or behaviour,37 or be 
able to predict its behaviour. Even where problems are recognised, they can rarely be traced 
back to a single team member or action;38 responsibility must be assigned across the collective 
network of actors and choices that influenced the system’s design, training, and 
configuration.vii This uncertainty undermines the development of standards to be a ‘good’ AI 
developer, or a set of behaviours which will ultimately lead to ‘good’ or trustworthy AI, 
because the effects of development decisions cannot be reliably predicted at the time they are 
made. 
AI Ethics initiatives aim to address this gap by defining broadly acceptable principles to guide 
the people and processes responsible for the development, deployment, and governance of AI 
across radically different contexts of use. This may be an impossible task.39,40 The great 
diversity of stakeholders and interests involved necessarily pushes the search for common 
values and norms towards a high level of abstraction.23 The results are statements of principles 
or values based on abstract and vague concepts, for example commitments to ensure AI is 
‘fair’, or respects ‘human dignity’, or enables ‘human flourishing’, which are not specific 
enough to be action-guiding.8  
Statements reliant on vague normative concepts hide points of political and ethical conflict. 
‘Fairness’, ‘dignity’, ‘flourishing’ and other such abstract concepts are instances of “essentially 
contested concepts,” or concepts with many possible conflicting meanings requiring contextual 
interpretation through one’s background political and philosophical beliefs.41 These different 
interpretations, which can be rationally and genuinely held, lead to substantively different 
requirements in practice.42 These incompatible interpretations will only be revealed once 
principles or concepts are translated and tested in practice. At best, this conceptual ambiguity 
allows for context-sensitive specification of ethical requirements for AI. At worst, it masks 
fundamental, principled disagreement and drives AI Ethics towards moral relativism. At a 
minimum, any compromise reached thus far around core principles for AI Ethics does not 
reflect meaningful consensus on a common practical direction for ‘good’ AI development and 
governance. We must not confuse high-level compromise with a priori consensus.  
The truly difficult part of ethics—actually translating normative theories, concepts and values 
into ‘good’ practices AI practitioners can adopt—is kicked down the road like the proverbial 
can, left to developers to translate principles and specify essentially contested concepts as they 
see fit, without a clear roadmap for unified implementation. For an established profession with 
                                                 
vii It is worth noting that these challenges arguably apply to individual medical professionals’ understanding of 
the ‘medical system’. However, clearly bounded clinical or ‘bed side’ interventions have much clearer and 
immediate impact. 
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a rich history, ethical culture, and norms of ‘good’ practice to draw on to translate principles 
into practice, this ambiguity would be less concerning. Unfortunately, this is not the case for 
AI development. 
2.3 Methods to translate principles in practice 
The third weakness of a principled approach to AI Ethics is the absence of proven methods to 
translate principles into practice. The prevalence of essentially contested concepts in AI Ethics 
begs a question: How can normative disagreements over the ‘correct’ interpretation of such 
concepts be resolved in practice? 
Principles do not automatically translate into practice.20 Throughout its history, medicine has 
developed effective ways of translating high-level commitments and principles into practical 
requirements and norms of ‘good’ practice.19 Professional societies and boards, ethics review 
committees, accreditation and licensing schemes, peer self-governance, codes of conduct and 
other mechanisms help determine the ethical acceptability of day-to-day practice by assessing 
difficult cases, identifying negligent behaviour, and sanctioning bad actors.43,44 The formal 
codes and informal norms that now govern medical practice have been extensively tested, 
studied, and revised over time, with their recommendations and norms (and underlying 
principles) evolving to remain relevant.  
AI development does not have comparable empirically proven methods to translate principles 
into practice in real-world development contexts. This is a multi-faceted methodological 
challenge. Translation involves the specification of high-level principles into mid-level norms 
and low-level requirements. Norms and requirements can rarely be logically deduced directly 
from principles without accounting for specific elements of the technology, application, context 
of use, or relevant local norms.45,46viii Rather, normative decisions must be made at each stage 
of translation.46 It follows that the justification arising from widespread consensus on a set of 
common principles does not transfer to the mid-level norms and low-level requirements 
derived from them. Each stage of translation and specification must be independently justified. 
This observation reveals the scope of work that remains for AI Ethics. High-level consensus is 
encouraging, but it has little bearing on the justification of norms and practical requirements 
proposed within specific contexts of use. Due to the necessity of local justification, the 
prominence of essentially contested concepts in AI Ethics, and the field’s relative lack of a 
binding professional history (see: Section 2.2), conflicting practical requirements will likely 
emerge across the diverse sectors and contexts in which a principled approach to AI Ethics is 
used. 
One other methodological challenge remains. Thus far, we have assumed that norms and 
normative practical requirements can be successfully procedurally embedded in development, 
and functionally implanted in design requirements. Neither can be taken for granted.  Prior 
work in computer ethics and science and technology studies points to the difficulty of 
embedding ethical values and principles in technology design and the development cycle.1,46–
                                                 
viii Reflecting this, medical ethics committees rarely factor high-level principles into their deliberation; rather, 
the facts of the case, precedents and relevant intuitions take priority.45 This finding accords with principilism, by 
which ethical decision-making ideally involves deliberation between case-specific facts and intuitions, 
precedents, and relevant background principles and theories to reach a consensus, or ‘reflective equilibrium’.15 
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48 Many such methods exist,ix including participatory design, reflective design, Values@Play, 
and Value-Sensitive Design,1 but thus far they have largely been implemented and studied in 
academic contexts which are more receptive to normative concerns than commercial 
settings.21,49,50 Value-conscious methods are also largely procedural, not functional. Generally 
speaking, they introduce values, normative issues, and relevant stakeholders into the 
development process.46 They do not, however, allow for particular values to be ‘injected’ into 
system design, and struggle to capture the degree to which the resulting artefact reflects 
particular values or specifications of essentially contested concepts.47x 
Value-conscious design frameworks face additional challenges in commercial development 
processes. Ethics has a cost. AI is often developed behind ‘closed doors’ without public 
representation. Gathering the views of relevant stakeholders, embedding an ethicist with the 
development team, resolving conflicts between different specifications of essentially contested 
concepts, and similar methods add additional work and costs to the research and development 
process. Unsurprisingly, ethical considerations may be discarded when they conflict with 
commercial incentives.21 It cannot be assumed that value-conscious frameworks will be 
meaningfully implemented in commercial processes that value efficiency, speed, and profit. 
2.4 Legal and professional accountability 
The fourth weakness of a principled approach to AI Ethics is the relative lack of legal and 
professional accountability mechanisms. Medicine is governed by legal and professional 
frameworks which uphold professional standards and provide patients with redress for 
negligent behaviour, including malpractice law, licensing and certification schemes, ethics 
committees, and professional medical boards.43,44 Legally supported accountability 
mechanisms provide an external impetus for health professionals to fulfil their fiduciary duties, 
amplifies the impact of complementary forms of self-governance by establishing a clear link 
between ‘bad’ behaviour and professional sanctions (e.g. losing one’s license to practice),14 
mandates a professional standard of care, and allows patients to make claims against negligent 
members of the profession.  
Excluding certain types of risks (e.g. privacy violations governed by data protection law), AI 
development does not have comparable legally and professionally endorsed accountability 
mechanisms.xi This is a problem. Serious, long-term commitment to self-regulatory 
frameworks cannot be taken for granted.4,5  
Prior research on the impact of codes of ethics on professional behaviour has turned up mixed 
results. Codes are often followed in letter rather than spirit, or as a ‘checklist’ rather than as 
part of a critical reflexive practice.23,52,53 A recent study of the Association for Computing 
Machinery’s (ACM) Code of Ethics revealed that it has little effect on the day-to-day decision-
making of software engineering professionals and students.54 Other studies of corporate and 
professional codes of ethics outside computing have reported similar results.55–57 A recent 
                                                 
ix Morley et al. provide an up-to-date overview of tools, methods, and research to translate AI Ethics principles 
into practice.49 
x Other value-specific methods, such as ‘privacy by design’ or ‘security by design’ are more successful in this 
regard, in part because they address technically tractable normative concepts. 
xi While contract law can provide legal accountability in some cases, it is not directly comparable to medical 
malpractice or tort which define negligence against a heightened ‘professional standard of care’ to be upheld by 
individual practitioners. Such a standard has not been recognised historically for computing professionals.51 
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meta-analysis of evidence on the impact of codes on professional behaviourxii found that the 
mere existence of a code has no discernible effect on unethical behaviour; rather, an effect is 
only found when codes (and their underlying principles) are embedded in organisational culture 
and actively enforced.26,58,59 Norms must be clearly defined and highly visible if they are to 
influence practitioners14 and inspire peer self-governance. Current governance structures in AI 
companies are insufficient in this regard.2 
External sanctions also play an important role. Studies of other professions have shown that 
the existence of sanctions for breaching a code of ethics is key for adherence and effective self-
governance.14 Compared with medicine, information professions lack sanctions that can impact 
the professional’s livelihood.23 While software engineering degrees can now be accredited, a 
license is not required to practice,60 with some national exceptions.61–63 Professional bodies 
such as the IEEE and ACM lack formal sanction powers beyond expulsion from the 
organisation. As licensing is not provided by either organisation, their impact on a developer’s 
livelihood or the ability to practice is limited.  
The lack of empirical evidence linking codes of ethics to actual impact on developer behaviour 
raises a difficult question: is it enough to define ‘good intentions’ and hope for the best? 
Without complementary punitive mechanisms and bodies providing appeal and redress that can 
step in’ when self-governance fails, a principled approach runs the risk of merely providing 
false assurances of ethical or trustworthy AI.64  
While stronger legal and professional accountability mechanisms could be adopted, this seems 
unlikely in the near term. AI development is not a unified profession with a long-standing 
history and harmonised aims (see: Sections 2.1 and 2.2). Professional accountability 
mechanisms are created to protect clients and the public,65 but AI developers do not provide a 
public service and predominantly work in commercial institutions. As a result, public interests 
do not need to be given provisional primacy over competing commercial interests. AI also does 
not operate in a single sector, meaning any new legal or professional mechanisms will need to 
account for many different types of possible benefits and harms, and integrate with existing 
sector-specific law and policy. Finally, proposals to introduce professional sanctions and 
licensing schemes for computing professionals are also not new, but have thus far seen limited 
uptake.61,63,66xiii    
3 Where should AI Ethics go from here? 
The four critical challenges facing AI Ethics are now clear. First, AI development is not a 
formal profession with aims that align with public interests (Table 1 reviews five criteria 
traditionally required for legal recognition).xiv Fiduciary duties are owed principally to 
                                                 
xii It should be noted that the effect studied is on reducing unethical behaviour, which is a distinct phenomenon 
from the positive encouragement of ethical behaviour and embedding of values in technology design and 
governance which is pursued in AI Ethics. 
xiii In particular, see the work of Donald Gotterbarn from the 1990’s and early 2000’s.67 
xiv A classic legal definition of a profession was provided in Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. V. Staten Island 
Hosp, 788 F.Supp. 1351, (D.NJ 1992): “A profession is not a business. It is distinguished by the requirements of 
extensive formal training and learning, admission to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of ethics 
imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond those that prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace, a 
system for discipline of its members for violation of the code of ethics, a duty to subordinate financial reward to 
social responsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even in non-professional matters, to conduct 
themselves as members of a learned, disciplined, and honorable occupation…Professionals may be sued for 
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shareholders, not the public. Second, developers are not governed by a historically validated 
account of what it means to be a ‘good’ AI developer. Third, outside of academic contexts AI 
development lacks proven methods to translate principles into practice. It remains unclear how 
developers should specify essentially contested concepts into practical behavioural norms and 
system requirements. And finally, when a developer falls afoul of these vaguely defined 
requirements, there remain few sanction mechanisms and channels for redress to set things 
right. Signing up to self-regulatory codes lacking clearly defined and enforceable obligations 
costs developers nothing, but can have immediate benefits in terms of trustworthiness and 
reputation.  
We must therefore hesitate to celebrate consensus around high-level principles that hide deep 
political and normative disagreement. Shared principles are not enough to guarantee 
‘Trustworthy AI’ or ‘Ethical AI’ in the future. Without a fundamental shift in regulation, 
translating principles into practice will remain a competitive, not cooperative, process. This is 
a problem, as principles remain vacuous until tested, at which point the true costs and worth of 
a principled approach to AI Ethics will be revealed. Conflicting prescriptions of essentially 
contested concepts are to be expected. Resolving these conflicts is where the real work starts 
for AI Ethics. A key question remains: how can this essential work be supported by 
government, industry, government, and civil society?  
1. Clearly define sustainable pathways to impact 
A principled approach requires cooperative oversight to ensure translated norms and 
requirements remain fit for purpose and impactful over time. Going forward, the long-term 
aims and pathways to impact of principled initiatives must be more clearly defined (see: Table 
2 for key questions). Self-regulatory frameworks must be embedded and highly visible in 
organisational culture to be effective.24 Binding accountability structures as well as clear 
implementation and review processes are needed at a sectoral and organisational level. While 
select AI companies have created (and disbanded) ethics committees,68 their remit, 
independence, and decision-making power is rarely clear. Publicising decisions of internal 
ethics committees could, for example, clarify the impact of principles on AI development and 
governance.17 Professional norms can be established by defining clear requirements for 
inclusive design, documentation of models and datasets, and independent auditing for bias, 
discrimination, and other ethical concerns.  
2. Support ‘bottom-up’ AI Ethics  
A ‘top-down’ approach to AI Ethics is uniquely difficult due to the diversity of technologies 
described as ‘AI’. Inevitably, principles created to govern such a broad category of 
technologies are vague (see: Section 2.3). In such a diverse field, a bottom-up, case-based 
approach to ethics may be more effective. Professional ethics have historically developed in 
                                                 
malpractice because of the higher standards of care imposed on them by their profession and by state licensing 
requirements engenders trust in them by clients that is not the norm of the marketplace. When no such higher 
code of ethics binds a person, such trust is unwarranted.” Other judgements from the United States that have not 
recognised software engineering and related vocations as a profession include: Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National 
Cash Register Corp, Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. v. Staten 
Island Hospital, RKB Enterprise, Inc. v. Ernst and Young. However, some progress towards formal 
professionalisation occurred in Data Processing Services, Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp. and Diversified Graphics, 
Ltd. v. Groves. 
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medicine and engineering following precisely this path; local practices and lessons emerge and 
spread across the field and industry from which principles and precedents can then be derived.14 
Novel cases reveal new challenges for AI Ethics, which are desperately needed to move the 
field beyond well-worn cases11,69 and develop sector- and case-specific guidelines, technical 
solutions, and an empirical knowledge base. To complement the considerable top-down work 
already undertaken, increased support and access to development settings should be made 
available to support multi-disciplinary bottom-up research and development in AI Ethics. The 
recent rapid growth of multi-disciplinary research networks addressing ethical, social, and legal 
implications of AI (e.g. FAT-ML) gives cause for optimism.  
3. License developers of high-risk AI 
To encourage long-term recognition of ethical commitments, it may be necessary to formally 
establish AI development as a profession with equivalent standing to other high-risk 
professions.xv Doctors, lawyers, and other professions in the public service require a license to 
practice. It is a regulatory oddity that we license these professions providing a public service, 
but not the profession responsible for developing technical systems to augment or replace 
human expertise and decision-making within them. The risks of licensed professions have not 
dissipated, but rather been displaced to AI. Licensing initiatives could initially target 
developers of systems with elevated risk or built for the public sector, such as facial recognition 
systems designed for policing. 
4. Shift from professional ethics to business ethics  
The outputs of many AI Ethics initiatives resemble professional codes of ethics that address 
design requirements and the behaviours and values of individual professions.1 The legitimacy 
of particular applications and their underlying business interests remain largely 
unquestioned.1,71 This approach conveniently steers debate towards the transgressions of 
unethical individuals, and away from the collective failure of unethical businesses and business 
models.72 Developers will always be constrained by the institutions that employ them. To be 
truly effective, the ethical challenges of AI cannot conceptualised as individual failures. Going 
forward, AI Ethics must become an ethics of AI businesses as well.  
5. Pursue ethics as a process, not technological solutionism 
Many initiatives suggest ethical challenges can best be addressed through “technical and design 
expertise,” and address concepts for which technical fixes seem feasible (e.g. privacy, 
fairness),1 but rarely propose technical definitions or explanations.5xvi The rationale seems to 
be as follows: insufficient consideration of ethics leads to poor design decisions which create 
systems that harm users. Framing ethical challenges in terms of design flaws ensures they 
remain “fundamentally technical, shielded from democratic intervention” or regulation.1 The 
need to translate high-level principles and essentially contested concepts into practical 
requirements, which can be difficult and time-consuming in practice, is seemingly avoided.  
                                                 
xv Formal public service obligations could also be recognised for commercial AI companies. A related  proposal 
in the United States involves re-conceptualising data-driven companies as “information fiduciaries” with formal 
fiduciary duties towards data subjects.70 
xvi Initiatives such as the IEEE ‘Ethically-Aligned Design’ programme, which has gone to great lengths to begin 
translating high-level principles into practical requirements and technical standards for AI, are a rare exception 
to this trend.6  
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This attitude is misguided. The promise of AI largely owes to its apparent capacity to replace 
or augment human expertise. This malleability means AI inevitably becomes entangled in the 
ethical and political dimensions of vocations and practices in which it is embedded. AI Ethics 
is effectively a microcosm of the political and ethical challenges faced in society. It is foolish 
to assume that very old and complex normative questions can be solved with technical fixes or 
‘good’ design alone.xvii The risk is that complex, difficult ethical debates will be oversimplified 
to make the concepts at hand computable and implementable in a straightforward but 
conceptually shallow manner.11 Concepts are like physical tools; they wear out and must be 
philosophically reconstructed in different contexts and in response to new technologies.41 
Ethics is not meant to be easy or formulaic. Intractable principled disagreements should be 
expected and welcomed, as they reflect both serious ethical consideration and diversity of 
thought. They do not represent failure, and do not need to be ‘solved’. Ethics is a process, not 
a destination. The real work of AI Ethics begins now: to translate and implement our lofty 
principles, and in doing so to begin to understand the real ethical challenges of AI. 
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Tables 
 
 
Table 2 - Key questions to assess AI Ethics 
value and principle statements 
1. Who wrote it, and how? 
2. Who is it intended for, and what is its 
purpose? 
3. Why should I follow it?  
4. How do I follow or implement it?  
5. How should I resolve conflicting 
interpretations of essentially contested 
concepts? 
6. How will you know I am following it? 
7. What happens if I fail to follow it? 
8. How can I raise disagreements or 
questions for clarification? 
Table 1 - Characteristics of a Formal Profession 
1. Specialised education and training - Members are 
expected to have undertaken extensive specialised 
education and training,51 typically in accredited degree 
programmes.33  
2. Commitment to public service - Professions involve a 
public declaration to provide a service to society or for the 
public good making use of specialised, often privileged 
expertise65 which takes precedence over individual gain.51  
3. Higher standard of care - Professionals commit to 
upholding higher ethical standards than would normally 
be expected in business relationships in service to both 
the client and the public.51  
4. Enforcement and self-governance - Often, these 
standards are recorded in an ethical code and enforced 
through a disciplinary system, administered by 
professional associations.63,65  
5. Licensing – Entry to the profession is restricted by 
(government sanctioned) licensure to highly skilled 
individuals as a means to protect the public.33,51 
 
